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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion). a7 Ethridge seems to extend this line of cases to (at least
some) payments made under state contracts. Together Ethridge
and the earlier line of cases seem to be consistent with a new prin-
ciple. Substantial state payments to a discriminating private or-
ganization make the discriminatory acts of the private organization
"state action."381
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS
Defamation-Damages-Requirements for Collection of
Substantial Damages in Actionable Per Se Defamation
In R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers,' a defamation
action arising out of a labor organization campaign, the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated the following rule in regard to
damages recoverable for a defamatory statement adjudged actionable
per se :2
"See, e.g., Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963).
" Compare Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964)
with Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) and
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
1270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E.2d 344 (1967). For the complete text of the
defendant's five further answers and defenses and the various motions, de-
murrers and rulings that gave rise to its appeal, see id. at 163-66, 154 S.E.2d
at 349-51. The basic issues raised concern questions of qualified privilege in
labor organization campaign communications, federal preemption of labor
defamation actions under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
1964), and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
1964), state jurisdiction to award damages for labor dispute defamation
under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,
and whether plaintiff's damages allegations were sufficient to state a cause
of action. The court held in favor of the plaintiff on all questions but that
of privilege, ruling on that point that the defense of qualified privilege does
extend to defamatory statements made during labor organization campaigns.
2 Defamation considered sufficient to establish a cause of action without
proof of specific monetary loss, i.e., special damages, is referred to as action-
able per se. Slander is generally not actionable per se unless it imputes
commission of a crime, a loathsome disease, unchastity to a woman, or
tends to affect the plaintiff in his trade or profession. W. PROSSER, LAW or
ToRTs 772 (3d ed. 1964). Under the common law, all libel was considered
actionable per se. However, confusion has arisen in this country over the
division of libel into two types-libel per se and libel per quod. In some
states, libel per se-or libel defamatory on its face-maintains its actionable
per se character, although libel per quod-that requiring the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to establish its defamatory nature-is not considered
actionable without proof of special damages. Prosser, More Libel Per
Quod, 79 HARv. L. Rnv. 1629 (1966) ; Eldridge, The Spurious Ride of Libel
Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1966). The North Carolina courts have
not escaped this confusion. See Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d
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[E]ven though the alleged statements were published by the de-
fendant, were not privileged, were false and had a natural and
immediate tendency to impair the plaintiff's repuation in the
area of its customer or employee relations, the plaintiff can re-
cover, under the law of this State, as compensatory damages,
only a nominal amount in absence of proof of both the fact and
the extent of damages actually suffered by it as a result of the
publications.3
Although the statement is dictum, it represents a change in defa-
mation law. Most jurisdictions hold that general damages4 are
presumed as a natural consequence of actionable per se defamation,
thus establishing a cause of action and insuring at least a verdict
for the plaintiff.5 Further, the plaintiff who fails to plead or prove
some actual injury resulting from the defamation is not automati-
cally limited to a nominal recovery; substantial damages may be
awarded based solely on the presumption.6 North Carolina, at least
660 (1954) (all libel actionable per se). Contra, Flake v. Greensboro
News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (libel per quod requires proof
of special damages to be actionable). The conflicting language used in both
Flake and Kindley is quoted with apparent approval in Bouligny. R.H.
Bouligny, Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 168-69, 154 S.E.2d
344, 353 (1967). The libel per se-libel per quod confusion in this state
is not within the scope of this note. For a full discussion of this problem,
see Torts, Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 35 N.C.L.
REv. 177, 256 (1957); 33 N.C.L. R~v. 674 (1955).
'R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 170, 154
S.E.2d 344, 353-54 (1967) (emphasis added). Although discussed, the
question of proof required in order to collect more than nominal damages, a
cause of action having been established, was not directly submitted to the
court.
'The elements of general damages include injury to reputation, physical
pain and inconvenience, humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering.
Payne v. Thomas, 176 N.C. 401, 97 S.E. 212 (1918); Osborne v. Leach,
135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).
Starks v. Comer, 190 Ala. 245, 67 So. 440 (1914) ; Stidham v. Wachtel,
41 Del. 327, 21 A.2d 282 (Super. Ct. 1941); Hermann v. Newark Morning
Ledger, 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. 1958); Badame v.
Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955); Roth v. Greensboro News
Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1940); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); James v. Powell, 154 Va. 96, 152 S.E. 539
(1930); Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 44 Wash.2d 183, 265
P.2d 1051 (1954), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 37 (1954); C. McCoR-
MincK, LAW oF DAMAGES 423 (1935) (hereinafter cited as McCoRMicK);
M. NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 810 (4th ed. 1924).
'Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1943); Starks
v. Comer, 190 Ala. 245, 67 So. 440 (1914); Barnett v. McClain, 153 Ark.
325, 240 S.W. 415 (1922); Stidham v. Wachtel, 41 Del. 327, 21 A.2d 282
(Super. Ct. 1941); Walsh v. Trenton Times, 124 N.J.L. 23, 10 A.2d 740
(Ct. Err. & App. 1940); Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 44
Wash.2d 183, 265 P.2d 1051 (1954); see Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-
1967]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
prior to the 1962 opinion cited as authority for Bouligny,l has
been in accord with this rule." Since then, however, this presump-
tion of damages appears to suffice only to establish a cause of action
in those situations where proof of special damages is not required.'
It no longer will support a recovery of more than a nominal amount.
One possible explanation for the language is that it is influenced
by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers.'" In that case, it was held that the Labor Management
Relations Act does not preempt state jurisdiction in libel actions
arising out of labor organization campaigns." It was also held
that in order to recover the plaintiff must prove that the statements
were made with malice and caused some form of harm recognized
as compensable under state tort law.' 2 As interpreted by Bouligny,
this Linn proof requirement is necessary in order to establish a
cause of action."3 The Bouligny dictum under consideration, how-
ever, calls for proof of damages in order to collect more than a
Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934); Tripp v. Thomas, 107
Eng. Rep. 792 (1824); McCoRMICx 423; M. NEWELL, supra note 10, at 821;
3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621, comment a (1938); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 569, comment c at 91 (Tent. Draft No. 11,
1965). Some cases indicate that even if the presumption of damages is
controverted, plaintiff is still entitled to a substantial award. See Modisette
& Adams v. Lorenze, 163 La. 505, 112 So. 397 (1927); Hermann v. Newark
Morning Ledger, 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. 1958);
Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd. supra.
" Jones v. Hester, 262 N.C. 487, 137 S.E.2d 846 (1964) (per curiam). Re-
fusing to hold a jury's award of nominal damages invalid, the court stated
that a verdict on publication of the libel "entitled the plaintiff to nominal
damages. Any further compensatory damages (other than nominal) could
be awarded only upon the basis of proof, by the greater weight of the
evidence." New trials have been awarded in other jurisdictions due to
inadequacy of the verdict. See, e.g., Kehoe v. New York Tribune, Inc., 229
App. Div. 220, 241 N.Y.S. 676 (1930).
8 Barringer v. Deal, 164 N.C. 246, 80 S.E. 161 (1913); see Roth v.
Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1939) (dictum); Flake
v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1937) (dictum);
Brandis & Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North Caro-
lina, 31 N.C.L. Rnv. 249, 272 & n.157 (1953).
'R.H. Bouligny. Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 169, 154
S.E.2d 344, 353 (1967).
10383 U.S. 53 (1966).
11Id. at 61.
'2 Id. at 64-65. The Linn decision required proof of malice and damages
in order to protect labor unions and smaller employers from "the propensity
of juries to award excessive damages for defamation," thereby attempting
to balance the state's interest in protecting its residents from malicious libel
with the "effective administration of national labor policy." Id.
13 R.H. Boulignv, Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 176, 154
S.E.2d 344, 358 (1967).
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nominal award, the cause of action already having been established.
Of course, this difference of emphasis between proof allowing judg-
ment and proof allowing substantial recovery does not in itself mean
that Linn was not the motivation behind the Bouligny proof re-
quirement. However, the Bouligny language itself is broad, and
it was arrived at by the North Carolina court without mention of
Linn. Indeed, the only case cited as authority for Bouligny in this
regard was an action involving two individuals. 4 All these factors
considered together point to the conclusion that the particular Bou-
ligny paragraph in question is not controlled by the Linn case. Thus
it seems that the language is meant to apply to all libel and slander
suits in North Carolina that are deemed actionable without proof
of special damages.
Although Bouligny calls for proof of the fact and extent of harm
before substantial damages will be awarded, there are several pos-
sibilities as to the degree of proof that will satisfy this demand. It
may be argued that the proof of damages required by Bouligny can
be satisfied by the presumption of damages arising under the com-
mon law. This was the result in a New Jersey case, which held
that:
This requirement that the damages be 'proved' is not necessarily
inconsistent with an allowance of general damages by 'presump-
tion.' Such a presumption arises by logical inference from the
patently defamatory character of a publication, assisted by the
reasoning of experience, and stands as an element of proof which,
until overcome by contrary proof, will support a verdict for gen-
eral damages.' 5
Under such an interpretation, there would be no practical change
made by Bouligny.
1 4Jones v. Hester, 262 N.C. 487, 137 S.E.2d 846 (1964).
15 Bock v. Plainfield Courrier-News, 45 N.J. Super. 302, 312, 132 A.2d
523, 528 (Super. Ct. 1957). The issue arose under the New Jersey Retrac-
tion Statute, which provides that if a non-malicious statement has been
retracted, the plaintiff "shall recover only his actual damage proved and
specifically alleged in the complaint." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 43-2 (1952).
Construction of the North Carolina Retraction Statute has never required
consideration of this point, the statute providing only that "plaintiff . . .
shall recover only actual damages. . . ." making no mention of the need
to prove those damages. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-2 (1965). The phrase
"actual damages" has been defined as encompassing all but punitive damages,
i.e., special damages, physical pain and suffering, mental suffering and injury
to reputation. Pentuff v. Park, 194 N.C. 146, 138 S.E. 616 (1927); Osborn
v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).
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General damages are said to be proved by introduction of evi-
dence tending to show the probable impact of the defamation (as
opposed to direct proof of injury)." This, then, is another pos-
sible interpretation of the degree of proof of harm required by
Bouligny. Elements admissible as evidence usually include such
things as the severity of the language, plaintiff's social and financial
standing, the extent of publication of the defamation, and the de-
fendant's influence as measured by his standing in the community.
Introduction of such evidence is always advisable in an effort to
increase the damages award.18 To require it would amount to a
shift from the realm of "ought to" in an effort to increase the dam-
ages award to the realm of "must" in order to qualify for a sub-
stantial damages verdict. It would have little practical effect, since
such evidence is most often introduced as a matter of course.
10
However, the general intangible nature of reputational injury0 dic-
tates that the absence of this evidence would not necessarily mean
that the plaintiff had gone unharmed.
When the North Carolina court required proof "of both the fact
and the extent of damages actually suffered," it could have been
imposing a requirement that the plaintiff prove special damages-a
specific dollars and cents loss-to collect more than nominal dam-
ages. This strict interpretation is arguable in light of the court's
holding that a meeting of the Linn proof of injury requirements
21
by the plaintiff would be sufficient "to permit recovery of nominal
damages." 2  This may mean, by inference, that a stricter proof
requirement than that imposed by Linn must be met in order to
" See MCCORMICK § 117.
"Id. There is conflicting authority over the admissibility of other fac-
tors, such as plaintiff's general good reputation (deemed presumed by many
courts), evidence of repetition by third persons, specific instances of the
effect of the defamation on individual recipients, and defendant's wealth
(allowed by most courts only on the issue of punitive damages). Id.; Note,
Direct Proof of General Damage by Defamation, 2 N.Y.L..REv. 305 (1924);
Comment, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. R-v. 875
(1956).
"8 Brandis & Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North
Carolina, 31 N.C.L. Ray. 249, 272 & n. 157 (1953).
19 MCCORMICK 423-24.
"0 See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
"1 As interpreted by the court in Bouligny, the Linn case requires proof
"that the publications 'injured the relations between the plaintiff and its
employees' or damaged 'the good name and reputation' of the plaintiff in the
eyes of the employees or prospective employees .... " R.H. Bouligny, Inc.,
v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 178, 154 S.E.2d 344, 359 (1967).22
1d.
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get more than nominal damages.28 Such a stricter requirement
would probably mean proof of pecuniary harm.24 The result would
be that compensation for often real but immeasurable harm (in
monetary terms) to reputation and feelings would become a rarity
in North Carolina defamation law.
The most likely interpretation of Bouligny's proof of damages
requirement, judging from the language on its face, is that the plain-
tiff must provide direct proof of both the fact and the extent of
injury before qualifying for substantial compensation. For ex-
ample, the plaintiff must objectively prove that his relationship with
friends has been unfavorably influenced, and perhaps the degree
of this influence, or how many of his friendships have been so
affected. Because of this likelihood, attention should be directed
to whether this is a desirable requirement.
In favor of such a requirement is the possibility that it may in-
ject a greater element of control and rationale into defamation
damages awards by juries2 5 It would facilitate the jury's under-
standing of the exact harm that their award should compensate and
would make easier the court's review of the jury's award. 6 This
same desirable goal could be approached, however, through dearer
explanation to the jury of the elements of presumed injury to repu-
tation for which they are to award compensation. 27 The advantage
"On the other hand, the phrase "to permit recovery of nominal dam-
ages" may be intended to refer only to the establishment of a cause of action,
and not to be read as meaning plaintiff can recover only nominal damages
in the absence of further proof. At best, the language is unclear.
2This assumes, of course, that the degree of proof required by Linn is
interpreted by Bodlgny as being direct proof of claimed injury. This ap-
pears to be the case. See note 21 supra.
" Amounts of verdicts vary from nominal damages of a few cents to
a fortune in six figures, according to numberless factors, such as the
age, sex, wealth, and personal attractiveness of the parties, the skill
of the respective counsel, the pungency of the defaming words, and
the infinite variety of experiences, sympathies, and prejudices of the
jurymen.
McCoRMIcK, supra note 10, at 443.
"' The criteria used by the courts in determining the reasonableness of
a damages award is whether it appears to be the result of passion or preju-
dice. See, e.g., Yates v. Mullins, 233 Ky. 781, 26 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
"' Comment, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARv. L. Rv.
875 (1956). The harms resulting from injury to reputation would consist
of such things as pecuniary injury, physical injury, mental suffering, and
loss of association.
By focusing directly upon these specific harms to the individual rather
than on the injury to reputation which caused them, the arbitrary
nature of jury awards of general damages might be somewhat reduced
1967]
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of such a practice, in lieu of requiring proof of damages, is that it
permits compensation for defamatory harm not subject to direct
proof. Besides, there is no guarantee that different men would not
assign different values to those injuries that were directly proved.
Thus the uncertainties in amounts of awards would continue to be
a factor under the Bouligniy proof requirement.
Under the interpretation of Bouligny being considered here,
those unable to prove directly some harm resulting from defamation
still would have the benefit of a verdict in their favor. This fact
forces one to consider the vindicatory function of a verdict without
damages. Vindication, or restoration of reputation, is probably the
relief most desired by victims of defamation. Thus, a verdict with-
out damages (or with only a nominal award) may satisfy the de-
famed28 while not burdening the defamer with potentially large
damages payments.29
The allowance of nominal damages performs a vindicatory func-
tion by enabling the plaintiff to brand the defamatory publication
as false. The rule that permits satisfaction of the deep seated
need for vindication of honor is not a mere historic relic, but pro-
motes the law's civilizing function of providing an acceptable
substitute for violence in the settlement of disputes. The judge-
ment also partakes of the nature of relief in equity by subduing,
or at least minimizing, the spread of harm to reputation.8 0
and the courts might be provided with at least a general standard for
determining the outer limits of proper awards of damages.
Id. at 936.
8 Of course, punitive damages may be assessed against a defendant in
some libel and slander cases. In North Carolina, such damages can be
awarded only if the defamation was perpetrated with actual malice (the
implied malice considered to accompany libel or slander per se will not
suffice), and the award must bear some reasonable relation to the circum-
stances. See, e.g., Cotton v. Fisheries Prods. Co., 181 N.C. 151, 106 S.E.
487 (1921). This note deals only with the compensatory damages aspect
of actionable per se defamation.
2" The "lie bill," a form of action apparently once used in some northern
Arkansas counties, provided a somewhat similar result. The slandered party
would file a "lie bill" against the defamer in a justice of the peace court.
If the plaintiff won his case, the verdict took the form of a declaratory
judgment in which the defendant was required to sign an admission that he
had lied about the plaintiff. See Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation,
6 ARK. L. Rav. 423 (1952).
" Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1966). The language was used in rejecting a requirement of proof of special
damages to establish a cause of action for libel per quod. However, the
court indicated that (similar to Bomdigny) it would require proof of injury
before allowing more than a nominal award: "[A] plaintiff need not show
any pecuniary damage in order to establish the libel and recover nominal
[Vol. 46
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Closer scrutiny, however, reveals several practical considerations
which tend to limit the effectiveness of these vindicatory functions
of a nominal damages verdict. First, a nominal award may indi-
cate to the general public that the plaintiff's damaged honor and
reputation have been assessed at a similar small value. 1 As put by
one English adjudicator, "[T]he damages awarded have to be re-
garded as the demonstrative mark of vindication.""2
Further, any idea that the spread of harm to reputation will be
minimized by a judgment must be considered in light of the speed-
or lack of it-with which verdicts are rendered. Crowded court
calendars and complex issues combine to make judicial vindication
painfully slow.3 At the same time, harm to reputation and feelings
can result in no less time than it takes a newspaper to be published,
distributed and read by the public. Indeed, the harm has run its
full course and been long ingrained in both recipients and victim
before judgment is rendered.
Finally, before any judicial vindication can assert itself, the
judicial system must be available to the victim of defamation. One
must contend with the prohibitive expense of defamation litigation, 4
and any further limitation of the possibility of making the action
pay its own way-i.e., by requiring direct proof of injury before
substantial damages may be awarded-may effectively close the
court's doors to less wealthy plaintiffs.
The vindicatory value of a verdict without substantial damages
is thus open to question. Compensation for injury from defamation
is probably the primary value of an action for damages. A require-
ment of direct proof of injury before the victim can collect substan-
damages, or compensation for non-pecuniary damage supported by the proof."
Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
" "The very nature of an action which prays for damages, in a society
where economic values dominate, implies failure in the action if substantial
damages be not awarded." Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK.
L. REv. 423, 428 (1952). "Thus a libel impugning the virtue of the" village
banker's daughter that results in a verdict for six cents implies that her
repuation for chastity was worth only that much." Donelly, The Right of
Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. Rxv. 867, 873
(1948).
" Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1960] 3 W.L.R. 229, 240
(H.L.), cited in Note, Problems of Assessing Damages for Defamation, 79
L.Q. REv. 63, 64 (1963).
" Comment, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1730, 1732 (1967).
" Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 604 (1964).
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tial damages limits the compensatory function of a defamation action
since direct proof of specific injury caused by defamation is often
difficult if not impossible.3
By the very nature of the harm resulting from defamatory publi-
cations, it is frequently not susceptible of objective proof. Libel
and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious and subtle.
The door of opportunity may be closed to the victim without his
knowledge, his business or professional career limited by the
operation of forces which he cannot identify but which, nonethe-
less, were set in motion by the defamatory statements.30
In light of these considerations-an uncertain and perhaps un-
necessary method of regulating jury determinations, the questionable
vindicatory value of a judicial verdict without damages, and the
inherent difficulty of the proof required-it seems more desirable
to permit the award of substantial compensation for defamatory
harm based on a presumption of damages. Maintenance of the full
scope of this presumption, coupled with more thorough instructions
to juries and a greater readiness to review their damages awards,
is a preferable alternative to the requirement of direct proof of dam-
age to qualify for substantial award-which seems to be the most
probable effect of Bouligny. This alternative permits compensation
for unprovable but present harm, and also offers greater protection
from unreasonable damages awards.
Finally, it must be admitted that it remains basically unclear
exactly what the Bouligny dictum intends to require of a plaintiff
seeking compensation for damages resulting from actionable per se
defamation. This added uncertainty as to what he must do to gain
substantial compensation for defamatory harm should be clarified
at the court's earliest opportunity.
RICHARD W. ELLIS
Estate Tax-Deductions-Life Beneficiary with Power to
Invade Corpus of Charitable Remainder
The Internal Revenue code of 1954 provides that in the deter-
mination of the taxable estate the value of all transfers, bequest,
legacies, or devises of property to certain public, charitable, or
" Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1966); RESTATEMiENT OF ToRTs § 621, comment a (1938).
"1 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs 468 (1956).
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